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Enabling Autocracy?  
Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Authoritarianism  
in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Sarah von Billerbeck 
Oisín Tansey  
 
 
ABSTRACT: Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international 
missions are deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, 
and seek to overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule; 
however, most regimes that experience peacebuilding still retain some form of authoritarian 
rule. In this paper, we examine the extent to which international peacebuilding missions 
contribute to the consolidation of post-conflict authoritarian regimes even when their stated 
aims involve the promotion of democracy. We argue that international peacebuilders can 
act as enablers of authoritarianism in host countries. We distinguish this category of 
behavior from explicit ‘autocracy promotion,’ which implies intentional support to 
autocracy. Instead, enabling is often an unintended consequence, and we identify two 
mechanisms through which enabling occurs: by building the capacity of incumbent 
authoritarian leaders and by signaling a permissive environment for authoritarian behavior 
for national actors. We illustrate our argument with the case of the UN peacekeeping 
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
 
Introduction 
Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are 
deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to help 
overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule. Yet despite these 
efforts, most regimes that experience peacebuilding retain some form of authoritarian rule (Toft, 
2010; Zürcher et al., 2013). In this paper, we examine the ways in which international 
peacebuilding missions contribute to post-conflict authoritarianism even when their stated aims 
involve the promotion of democracy.  
Our analysis builds upon a range of scholarship that has explored the political trajectories of 
post-conflict regimes, but that has yet to adequately address the relationship between 
peacebuilding and authoritarianism.1 Scholarship on why post-conflict regimes consolidate 
authoritarian rather than democratic governance has to date focused on domestic features of the 
society in question, including levels of economic development, the nature of the conflict, and the 
kind of political institutions established once the conflict ends (Fish and Kroenig, 2006; Reilly, 
                                                 
1 Note that we use the term peacebuilding to refer to multidimensional peacekeeping, in order to distinguish it from 
‘traditional’ peacekeeping, which is characterized by limited mandates that usually have little interest in or impact 
upon regime type or governance. 
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2001; Reynolds, 2010; Sambanis, 2000). More recent scholarship has examined the impact of 
peacebuilding missions, but has offered conflicting results and is characterized by a problematic 
democracy bias (Fortna and Huang, 2012; Joshi, 2010; Steinert and Grimm, 2015). Indeed, it has 
focused principally on the ways in which peacebuilding can contribute to democratic rule, but 
there is rarely any in-depth discussion of the causal mechanisms linking peacebuilding missions 
to authoritarian outcomes. Furthermore, with few exceptions the scholarship on post-conflict 
political transitions has tended to ignore the recent and vibrant literature on the politics of 
authoritarian rule (Art, 2012; Brownlee, 2007; Svolik, 2012). As a result, the relationship 
between peacebuilding and authoritarianism has to date been under-theorized.  
We seek to address this imbalance and examine the ways in which international 
peacebuilding contributes to authoritarian politics in post-conflict settings. We do not argue that 
international peacebuilders act as promoters of authoritarianism, but rather that as enablers, 
through both actions and inactions that provide material and informational relief to autocratic 
incumbents. Building on recent scholarship on authoritarianism, we identify two causal 
mechanisms through which international peacebuilders can bolster authoritarianism. First, by 
offering aid and assistance to individual ruling elites and by strengthening key institutions of the 
state, they can contribute to the state’s authoritarian capacities. Second, despite having a mandate 
to promote democracy, peacebuilders often refrain from robustly condemning or punishing 
authoritarian forms of behavior for fear of threatening existing relationships and endangering 
stability. In doing so they send signals to regime elites that lower the perceived costs of non-
democratic behavior and widen opportunity structures for authoritarian rule.  
To illustrate these dynamics, we examine the case of the United Nations (UN) peace 
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under the leadership of Joseph Kabila 
and the oversight of the UN mission, DRC has achieved some progress towards peace and 
stability. Yet despite embracing electoral politics it has failed to consolidate genuine democratic 
rule and the regime has turned increasingly authoritarian. Elections scheduled for 2016 have 
been repeatedly postponed, and Kabila’s rule has contributed to the rise of societal polarization, 
mass protests, and generalized political instability (Stearns 2017). Of course, it is likely that 
DRC would have struggled to democratize with or without the presence of a UN mission 
(Bermeo, 2003; Bernhard et al., 2003). At the time of the UN’s deployment, it lacked many of 
the conditions usually associated with democratic rule, such as economic wealth, a history of 
democracy, or a robust civil society. Consequently, we do not argue that the UN mission 
prompted the emergence of authoritarianism where democracy would otherwise have flourished. 
Rather, our aim is to identify how UN peacebuilders contributed to authoritarianism in DRC 
since 2003, and we argue that the current regime in DRC evolved as a result of both international 
and domestic action.2  
The article proceeds as follows. First, we offer a critical review of the literature on post-
conflict political development, identifying important flaws with existing approaches. Second, we 
identify the key pillars of authoritarian rule, and outline the two causal mechanisms of UN 
enabling. Third, we outline our research design. We then turn to the case study of DRC, 
                                                 
2 We examine the period from 2003, when the conflict in Congo formally ended, until the present. The mission was 
first known as the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo (MONUC) from 1999-2010 and 
subsequently as the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO) 
from 2010-present. 
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examining how the UN mission enhanced the institutional and coercive capacity of the state and 
expanded the political opportunity structures of the Kabila regime.  
 
  
 
Civil Conflict and Authoritarian Rule 
International peacebuilders invariably have to grapple with the politics of authoritarianism.3 Civil 
conflict is more likely to break out in authoritarian settings, which in turn also create the 
conditions for conflict recurrence (Toft, 2010: 24). Conflict tends to erode some of the core bases 
of democracy, including inter-community trust, economic development, and the presence of a 
burgeoning middle class (Bermeo, 2003; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Reynolds, 2010). Instead, 
conflict frequently contributes to conditions conducive to authoritarianism, as moderates are 
pushed to the margins and violent groups assume positions of authority (Lyons, 2016).  
Notably, the prevalence of authoritarianism after conflict comes despite intense efforts by 
international actors to foster democracy. UN peacebuilding missions usually include electoral 
assistance, political party capacity-building, and civic education campaigns aimed at introducing 
or restoring multi-party electoral competition (Call and Cook, 2003; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Paris 
and Sisk, 2008). This push to democratize post-conflict states is reflective of a broader 
conviction within the UN that liberal democracy provides protection against future conflict and 
is thus central to sustainable peace (Joyner, 1999; Newman and Rich, 2004). In this way, 
international peacebuilding rest on a set of overtly normative foundations related to institutional 
reform and the desirability of democracy. 
However, there are mixed findings on the success of these efforts and the scholarship in this 
area suffers from a number of limitations. Several authors find that democratization is more 
likely if a UN peacebuilding mission is deployed (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Joshi, 2013; 
Steinert and Grimm, 2015). Others are more skeptical about whether peacekeeping has any 
significant impact on post-conflict democracy, and Fortna (2008) finds no clear or positive 
relationship between peacekeeping and democratization.  
Recently, scholars have also begun to note the potential side effects of international 
peacebuilding interventions, including the risk that missions can strengthen illiberal elites who 
leverage their role as guarantors of stability and peace to stall democratic reform (Autesserre, 
2014: 147; Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011). As Gowan (2015: 32) observes, ‘the UN, having 
aspired to instill democracy and good governance in countries like the DRC and South Sudan, 
has ended up propping up unreliable and even autocratic leaders in the absence of better 
alternatives.’  
In addition to these mixed findings, the scholarship in this area suffers from a problematic 
democracy bias that manifests itself in two ways. First, the theoretical discussions in this work 
focus on the causal mechanisms linking peacebuilding primarily with democratic rather than 
authoritarian governance (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Joshi, 2010; Matanock, 2017; Steinert and 
Grimm, 2015; Wantchekon, 2004). For example, in their critical review of the literature Fortna 
and Huang (2012) test the hypotheses that peacekeeping leads to greater democratization or has 
no effect, without explicitly discussing authoritarian outcomes. While the empirical strategy of 
                                                 
3 We define authoritarianism as a regime in which the legislative and executive come to power through means other 
than free and fair elections (Svolik, 2012: 22).  
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many of these studies includes consideration of possible authoritarian outcomes (the dependent 
variable is often operationalized using a governance scale like Freedom House or Polity that 
includes values ranging from liberal democracy to closed authoritarianism), in practice the 
rhetorical and theoretical focus of these studies is restricted to democracy and democratization. 
Authoritarianism is implicitly or explicitly treated as the result of the absence of the 
democratising causal mechanisms, rather than the presence of autocratizing ones.  
Second, the scholarship in this area remains almost entirely divorced from the large and 
growing literature on authoritarianism (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). This is 
unfortunate, as this literature contains sophisticated discussions of causal mechanisms through 
which authoritarian regimes emerge and endure that could be helpful in analysing the effect of 
peacebuilding. Some recent studies have used theories of authoritarianism to illustrate the 
dynamics of post-conflict regime change, but they have focused primarily on domestic politics 
and largely ignored the role of international peacebuilding missions (Huang, 2016; Lyons, 2016). 
In the following section, we address these two limitations, and set out the theoretical foundations 
for understanding the influence of international peacebuilding missions on authoritarian politics.    
 
 
Peacebuilders as Enablers of Authoritarianism  
To establish and maintain political power, autocrats must overcome a series of formidable 
challenges. They have to manage elite coalitions, suppress the threat of mass mobilization among 
a disaffected public, and avoid costly sanctions from international democracy promoters 
(Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2015; Kendall–Taylor and Frantz, 2014; Svolik, 2012). To do this, 
autocrats must have the political and economic capital to pursue a number of strategies that lie at 
the heart of authoritarian stability, including repression, patronage, propaganda, and the strategic 
use of institutions to mobilize supporters and co-opt opponents. Authoritarian resilience thus 
often rests on domestic factors such as the coercive and economic capacity of the state, the 
presence of certain political institutions (such as ruling parties), and the unifying power of 
regime legitimation strategies (Bellin, 2004; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017; Levitsky and 
Way, 2013; Smith, 2005).  
In recent years, scholars have increasingly sought to examine the ways in which international 
forces can influence these domestic dynamics of authoritarian survival (Burnell and 
Schlumberger, 2010; Tansey, 2016; von Soest, 2015). Much of this literature has focused on the 
role of powerful states such as Russia, China, and the United States in intentionally assisting 
autocratic incumbents to repress or co-opt their opponents (Bader, 2015; Tolstrup, 2013; 
Vanderhill, 2013; Yakouchyk, 2018). Others focus on passive rather than actor-driven 
international influences, such as diffusion effects (Ambrosio, 2010; Koesel and Bunce, 2013; 
Weyland, 2016), the autocracy-reinforcing influences of certain international linkages (Tansey et 
al., 2015), and the international balance of power (Boix, 2011). We place our study within a third 
category of analysis that focuses on the unintended consequences of actor-driven foreign 
interventions (Tansey, 2016: 45). International actors often intervene in foreign settings in ways 
that reinforce authoritarian rule despite rather than because of the objectives being pursued, for 
example through aid (Kono and Montinola, 2009), sanctions (Marinov, 2005), and democracy 
promotion itself (Carothers, 2006). Our analysis adds international peacebuilding to this list.  
Indeed, despite their mandates to promote democracy, the policies that peacebuilders pursue 
often serve to benefit incumbent elites in ways that foster authoritarian rather than democratic 
forms of governance. We characterize international peacebuilders as ‘enablers’ of 
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authoritarianism, where enabling entails a form of inadvertent external influence that facilitates 
authoritarian behavior by domestic elites. Enabling behavior exists on a spectrum from toleration 
to outright support, and its core characteristic is that it reduces the negative consequences of 
authoritarian actions for incumbent elites. We distinguish this from autocracy promotion because 
it is unintentional. That is, even if authoritarian outcomes can be foreseen, they do not constitute 
an explicit objective, and instead are the unhappy side effect of other actions. In the case of UN 
peacebuilding, the enablers in question do not actively seek to encourage authoritarian behavior, 
but through both action and inaction they reduce the negative repercussions usually associated 
with it. As we discuss below, these unintended consequences are the result of both the competing 
imperatives that the UN faces in post-conflict environments and tensions internal to the UN—
particularly between its headquarters and missions in the field—about what to prioritize. As 
such, this work falls within the scholarship that has emphasized the unintended consequences of 
international aid and peacebuilding (Anderson, 1999; Aoi et al., 2007). This understanding of 
international enabling also distinguishes our approach from some of the critical writings on 
peacebuilding that trace the damaging effects of international intervention to an intentionally 
exploitative project where democracy promotion serves only as rhetorical window dressing 
(Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2014).  
Of course, the presence of a UN mission alone is not sufficient to contribute to authoritarian 
outcomes, and we expect that only certain forms of behavior will enable authoritarianism. 
Drawing on Tansey (2016), we identify two broad sets of causal mechanisms through which 
international peacebuilders can shape politics at the domestic level. The first concerns the ways 
in which peacebuilders enhance the capacity of regime incumbents, enabling them to project 
power, eliminate opponents, and secure their rule. The second concerns the flow of information, 
and how peacebuilders can send signals to domestic elites that lower the perceived costs of 
autocratic behaviour and broaden the opportunity structures for authoritarian rule.  
 
Material Mechanism: Enhancing Incumbent Capacity 
First, peacebuilders can directly enhance the capacity of host governments by providing 
institutional, security, and economic support that strengthens the regime. Indeed, capacity 
building is regularly at the heart of contemporary peacebuilding, including support to 
legislatures, political parties, the judiciary, and security forces (Lyons, 2004; Reynolds, 2010; 
Tansey, 2009). While capacity-building efforts often aim to promote democratic governance, 
they can contribute to authoritarian outcomes when elites use the state’s newfound powers to 
pursue repressive policies (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Way, 2005). Manipulating elections 
requires administrative capacity and technical knowledge. Repressing rival elites and 
constraining the citizenry requires state institutions that have the capacity to monitor and control, 
often through coercion. Finally, stronger regimes are more likely to be able to deflect the 
pressures of international shaming or sanctions.  
International peacebuilders thus face a dilemma, and must reconcile the competing imperatives 
of strengthening state actors and institutions and fostering democratic checks and balances that 
might challenge government authority. To date, scholars have found that UN missions have 
tended to resolve this tension in favor of the state, pursuing a top-down approach that often 
involves efforts to strengthen government elites at the expense of opposition forces (Autesserre, 
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2010: 91; Berdal and Zaum, 2013).4 This effect is partly due to the fact that the UN is an 
intergovernmental organization that would be hard-pressed to favor non-state actors over the 
state in any setting. It is also partly the result of the relationship between missions in the field 
and UN headquarters. There may be pressure from the latter to ensure stability, security, and 
measurable outputs, and missions may therefore be compelled to downgrade more normative 
objectives relating to democratization in favor of actions results delivery. 
As a result, we expect that the UN’s efforts will contribute to incumbent authoritarian capacity 
in a number of important ways, particularly related to institutional and security resources. The 
capacity-building functions and political reform agendas of international peacebuilding can 
enhance political structures in ways that strengthen and empower incumbent elites. The military 
contribution of peacebuilding can result in stronger domestic security forces, which benefit from 
direct training and exposure to professional international troops. Joint operations against rebel 
forces can also strengthen central government by reducing violent threats to its authority and 
altering the balance of power between incumbents and opposition forces. Furthermore, the 
infusion of economic resources that accompanies major international missions can expand the 
patronage opportunities for incumbents and facilitate the co-option of potential rivals. As a 
result, international peacebuilders can enable authoritarian rule even as they seek to promote 
peace and democracy.   
 
Informational Mechanism: Signaling and the Opportunity Structures for Authoritarianism  
Second, and more indirectly, peacebuilders can send important signals and cues to incumbent 
elites about the likely consequences of authoritarian behavior. The strategies that autocrats use to 
survive in power can be risky and costly. For example, election fraud or violent crackdowns on 
civil and political liberties are often met with an international backlash that can harm the 
legitimacy and security of the regime (Donno, 2013; Van Der Vleuten and Hoffmann, 2010). 
Consequently, incumbents must estimate the likely international response to establish if they are 
operating in a permissive or constrained environment. Peacebuilders can influence this dynamic 
by providing crucial information about the nature of the international environment and thus 
shaping incumbent perceptions of the kind of opportunity structure they face (Gleditsch and 
Ruggeri, 2010). 
Previous research has shown how external signals of support for incumbents can contribute to 
authoritarian outcomes by enhancing the perceived strength of the regime and lowering the 
perceived costs of repression (Tansey, 2016 Chapter 4; Tolstrup et al., 2018). International 
peacebuilders can engage in forms of toleration and tacit acceptance of authoritarian incumbents 
that provide crucial information about the permissive nature of the international environment.  If 
incumbents operate in an international environment with a robust democracy enforcement 
regime, their opportunities for overt authoritarian behavior are narrow. By contrast, if the 
international environment is characterized by low levels of democratic conditionality and 
enforcement, opportunities are much broader.  
International organizations often pursue weak or ‘tame’ forms of democracy advocacy due to 
institutional interests and incentives, including the need to maintain access to the target country 
(Bush, 2015). These dynamics are particularly apparent in the case of UN peacebuilding, where 
peacebuilding officials must balance their normative obligations with practical and operational 
                                                 
4 Indeed, as an intergovernmental organization composed of member states, it would be difficult, and even 
unacceptable, for the UN to favor opposition or non-state actors above the state.   
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ones and often face contradictory mandates (von Billerbeck, 2015). In normative terms, in 
addition to its commitment to democratization, the UN must be seen to respect sovereignty and 
the right to self-determination, and cannot impose its desired outcomes in the face of domestic 
opposition. In practical terms, the UN relies on the consent of the host government to deploy and 
remain in country. Furthermore, operational imperatives lead to an intense pressure on missions 
to achieve and maintain political stability—defined narrowly as the absence of a return to 
conflict—over and above other, potentially competing goals, such as democratization, the 
promotion of human rights, or justice. Much of this pressure can come from within the UN 
itself—from senior officials and member states at headquarters who push for quantifiable results 
and continued stability above normative objectives, thus making it difficult for missions to 
devise strong responses to authoritarian rule in the field, even if they want to.5  
As a result of these conflicting obligations, peacebuilders sometimes fail to actively promote 
or defend the democratic norms in their mandates even in the face of blatant violations. The UN 
often works closely with national leaders who have shown little or no commitment to democracy 
but who wield sufficient political authority to be indispensable for any sustainable political 
settlement. When these actors breach democratic norms, the UN may ultimately refrain from 
robust criticism and continue to work with them for the sake of stability and retaining consent 
(Gowan 2015). These forms of toleration and tacit acceptance send important signals about the 
permissive nature of the international environment. Through policies of quiet acquiescence and 
lax conditionality, international peacebuilders thus expand the opportunity space that incumbent 
elites enjoy by lowering the likely negative consequences of authoritarian behavior.  
 
 
Research Design  
We use a single case study to lay the foundations for a broader comparative research agenda on 
the relationship between peacebuilding and authoritarianism, conducting a plausibility probe of 
our theorized causal mechanisms. Plausibility probes are ‘preliminary studies on relatively 
untested theories and hypotheses’ that can establish if further comparative exploration is 
warranted (George and Bennett, 2005: 75). We use DRC because it is a ‘crucial case’ where the 
evidence is particularly suitable for assessing causal claims (Eckstein, 1975; George and Bennett, 
2005; Levy, 2008). More specifically, we argue that DRC is a ‘most-likely crucial case,’ where 
the independent variable is at a value that strongly predicts the outcome of interest.  
In DRC, the UN has spearheaded a highly ambitious and intrusive international mission in a 
nondemocratic context, so if there is a causal relationship between peacebuilding and 
authoritarian outcomes it is likely to be evident here. The UN has been present in DRC since 
1999 and its mission there has been among the UN’s largest (at its peak, deploying over 20,000 
civilian and military personnel).6 It is paradigmatic of the UN’s shift to multi-dimensional 
                                                 
5 Bode and Karlsrud (2018) argue that the failure to implement norms can also result from divergent understandings 
of those norms. While their argument focuses on divergent understandings among member states, their point—that it 
is not the norm itself that is contested but that different actors have different understandings of it—is relevant to our 
argument. Few peacebuilders argue that democratization is an unworthy goal, but that commitment is eroded during 
implementation. 
6 The UN mission in Congo is ongoing, so it is not possible to identify the final impact of the UN’s presence. 
However, there is sufficient evidence in the years since the mission has been deployed to illustrate its impact to date 
on the nature and trajectory of the post-conflict regime in DRC.  
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peacekeeping, entailing a robust operation authorized to use force and mandated to undertake a 
vast array of tasks that has evolved and expanded over time, including security sector reform 
(SSR), the protection of civilians, and support for state capacity.  
DRC also shows clear evidence in support of our argument for our dependent variable of 
interest. Freedom House has classified DRC as ‘Not Free’ in every year since the UN established 
a presence in the country in 1999, and the Polity index has consistently rated DRC as a non-
democracy. The Polity index also shows a sharp turn towards full-blown autocracy in recent 
years, with an 8-point drop in its 21-point scale (from a steady score of 5 in the years after 
DRC’s first post-conflict elections in 2006 to a score of -3 since 2016).7 DRC thus fits the profile 
of a most likely case that has high values on the dependent variable and that should, if our 
theoretical reasoning is correct, show clear evidence of our causal mechanisms. If we find no 
clear evidence of a link between UN peacebuilding and authoritarianism in DRC, a 
nondemocratic country playing host to an unusually authoritative UN mission, it would raise 
significant questions over the existence of any such relationship in general.  
Our case study draws on a range of primary and secondary documents, including UN 
Security Council Resolutions and Reports, media reports, and policy and scholarly literature. As 
a secondary method, we also draw on original data from over 80 interviews conducted between 
2009 and 2012 and between 2017 and 2018 with UN staff in MONUC, MONUSCO, and DPKO 
and Congolese political and civil society actors. We use these sources to identify how both UN 
action and inaction contributed to the institutional and coercive capacity of the regime and 
expanded Kabila’s opportunity structures through lax enforcement and acquiescent behavior. In 
order to classify UN behavior in DRC as autocracy enabling rather than promoting, we examine 
the language and policies of the UN mission. We do not find the kind of rhetorical and 
operational commitment to authoritarianism usually associated with outright regime promotion.8  
Furthermore, we do not argue that the UN was the sole or even principal driver of 
authoritarianism in DRC, nor do we advance a simplistic ‘no peacebuilding, no authoritarianism’ 
argument. Given its profile as a poor, conflict-affected country with limited history of 
democracy, it is likely that DRC would have consolidated an authoritarian regime had no UN 
mission existed. Rather, there are many paths to authoritarianism, and our aim is to illustrate the 
causal mechanisms through which international peacebuilders have contributed to the particular 
path to authoritarianism that has evolved in DRC. 
 
 
The UN and Authoritarianism in DRC 
The Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (MONUC) was established in 1999. After 
2003, when fighting formally concluded, the mission grew to have one of the most expansive 
mandates of all UN peacekeeping operations and became the largest mission in UN history 
(United Nations, n.d.; United Nations 2018b). In 2010, the mission was renamed the Mission de 
l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO). 
Importantly, like many other UN peace operations, MONUC’s and subsequently 
MONUSCO’s mandate is deeply liberal in nature and emphasizes the importance of 
                                                 
7 The Polity index runs from -10 to 10, and only countries that score 6 or more are classified as democracies 
(Freedom House, 2018; Marshall et al., 2017).  
8 For more on the methodological challenges of empirically identifying intentional regime promotion, see Tansey 
2016, 35-6. 
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democratization. Security Council Resolution 2409 (2018), which renewed MONUSCO’s 
mandate until 31 March 2019, calls on the mission to promote ‘reconciliation and 
democratization’ (United Nations, 2018c: 12) and its Political Affairs Division seeks to ‘monitor 
and support democratisation’ by building the capacity of state institutions and civil society 
(United Nations, 2018a). One of the earliest manifestations of this dedication to democratic 
principles was the enormous effort put into the 2006 presidential and legislative elections, which 
saw Kabila elected as the first post-transition president. The mission dedicated vast human, 
financial, and material resources towards the elections, including the training of over 250,000 
polling agents (United Nations, 2007), and the international community contributed over US 
$400 million (Carter Center, 2006: 18). While few claimed that the elections were a panacea for 
the country’s formidable challenges, they were considered a critical step in bringing the 
transition period to an end and setting the country on the path towards democratic reform—and 
thus stability. The mission played a significantly smaller role in the 2011 elections, but the belief 
in their importance for continued peace and stability remained (United Nations, 2011c). In 
addition to elections, the mission has consistently emphasized the need for a vibrant opposition, 
civil society participation, free media, enfranchisement of the population, and transparency in 
political processes. 
Despite the emphasis on democratization, the UN’s efforts have failed to prevent the 
consolidation of an authoritarian regime in DRC. Almost immediately after his election in 2006, 
Kabila was accused of clamping down on the opposition, the press, and civil society (Autesserre 
2010: 234; Matti, 2010: 57), and UN staff and other analysts began expressing alarm over the 
political direction of the country. One UN official described a serious ‘contraction of 
[democratic] political space,’ and Human Rights Watch warned that the government was 
‘heading in the direction of authoritarian rule’ (The Economist, 2009). In a 2010 report, the 
International Crisis Group cautioned that ‘[t]he danger of a return to authoritarianism is real’ 
(2010: 23). Subsequently, the 2011 elections were widely condemned as fraudulent, and 
members of civil society, human rights activists, the media, and opposition politicians have 
encountered restrictions, repression, and abuse (Carter Center, 2011a; Carter Center, 2011b). 
More recently, presidential and legislative elections due in 2016 have been repeatedly postponed, 
and while the constitution prevents Kabila from running for a third term, he has made attempts to 
change the constitution and to delay the elections indefinitely.  
Given the liberal bent of MONUC and MONUSCO and the many UN documents that 
mandate the UN to institutionalize international democratic standards in Congo, the 
consolidation of authoritarianism raises questions about the UN’s ultimate impact on the ground. 
As mentioned, there is a growing literature on the unintended consequences of peace operations, 
some of which has focused on DRC in particular. However, these studies tend to examine levels 
of violence or consequences for civilians, rather than regime type. For example, Matti (2010) 
describes an authoritarian turn in DRC, but her focus is on foreign aid flows, neglecting the UN’s 
influence. Autesserre (2010) discusses capacity building by the UN, but mentions authoritarian 
outcomes only in passing. In short, while several authors point to negative impacts of 
international involvement in DRC, none address authoritarianism as a distinct outcome worthy of 
theoretical exploration.  
In the following sections, we examine how the UN contributed to authoritarianism in Congo 
through the two mechanisms described above: building incumbent capacity, including 
institutional and security capacity, and signaling a permissive environment for authoritarian 
behavior. Our analysis adds further precision to the two broad causal mechanisms we identified 
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earlier, and illustrates a set of specific channels through which UN peacebuilding shaped 
authoritarianism in DRC.  
Importantly, though peace operations are generally expected to ‘work themselves out of a job’ 
by putting in place institutions and capacity so that national actors can sustain post-conflict 
reforms themselves, and one might therefore expect the degree of authoritarian enabling to wane 
over time, we do not find evidence of this in DRC. The nature of the mission and its relationship 
with the government has evolved but the UN has maintained a consistently high level of 
involvement in DRC, with only minor decreases in personnel levels and alterations in the breadth 
of its mandate. We therefore find that the overall enabling process remains mostly constant 
across the course of the mission. However, we do identify variation in the ratio of informational 
to material enabling in response to particular challenges and opportunities. In particular, we see 
high levels of both informational and material enabling either in moments where there is a 
perceived opportunity within the UN to engender positive change—for example during 
elections—or in response to major security incidents or authoritarian moves by the regime. This 
remains the case throughout the life of the mission, and in fact, some of the most salient 
examples of enabling come later on in the UN’s tenure in DRC. The precise type of enabling 
thus varies over time, but we do not observe a decreasing trend. Indeed, given the high profile of 
the mission in DRC, it is not surprising that both the pressure to deliver described above and the 
resulting risk of inadvertent enabling remain persistently elevated. The following sections outline 
how the two broad causal mechanisms worked in practice and tease out some of the key channels 
of international influence.  
 
Enhancing Incumbent Capacity  
 
As specified in its mandates, a number of the UN’s activities in Congo were geared towards 
building the capacity of state political and security institutions. We find robust evidence that 
these efforts contributed to Kabila’s capacity specifically and enabled his consolidation of 
political authority. The UN’s support in terms of institutional capacity was most pronounced 
during the transition period from 2003-2006, because the relative weakness of domestic 
institutions led to a perception that the mission could have a strong impact and bring about 
tangible democratic change. In later years, when the regime faced new violent challenges, the 
UN also increased its support for the state’s security institutions in ways that further solidified 
Kabila’s authority.  
 
The UN and Institutional Capacity  
The UN’s support to state institutions unwittingly facilitated the growth of authoritarianism in 
a number of ways. First, Congo’s transition process was structured to ensure a strong presidency, 
including an unelected transitional government and the promulgation of a constitution that 
emphasized the executive, and thus higher levels of support to that office than to the opposition 
or weaker political parties. This was done largely because the international community saw the 
presidency as key to stability, and in the tense and uncertain conditions after fighting ended, the 
international community wanted to avoid a return to war. Its intentions were thus good—it did 
not purposely set out to facilitate authoritarianism, and instead took actions that were aimed at 
fulfilling parts of its mandate. However, while a strong presidency in and of itself is not 
necessarily authoritarian, it can create obstacles to democratization (Linz, 1990). In the case of 
DRC, by supporting the executive so heavily, the UN neglected to build other institutions that 
could act as counterweights to the president or that could render the exercise of executive power 
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more transparent and equitable (Matti, 2010: 44, 53) and it gave the ruling party far greater 
visibility than other political parties and groups. As a result, the executive was in a better 
position to fend off challenges from and co-opt other elites, inhibit the opposition, and perform 
well in elections. 
Second, the office of the executive was highly personalized in Kabila. Between 2001 and 
2006, Kabila was MONUC’s most important interlocutor, and the transitional arrangements were 
designed to prevent any overwhelming threats to him. The then Under-Secretary-General of 
Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, describes how ‘[t]here was a fear, among key international 
actors, that [supporting opposition figures] could dangerously weaken the president and could 
lead to a resumption of war’ (Guéhenno, 2015: 153). Indeed, the prioritization of the executive 
signaled that whoever occupied this office held a privileged position with the UN, granting him 
or her considerable leverage to resist the UN, and Kabila was clearly singled out for this role. 
Third, capacity-building efforts during the transition focused on ensuring the passage of 
legislation relating to the elections and their subsequent organization, much more than on 
establishing a broader set of resilient institutions or building the capacity of a wide range of 
political actors. In this way, the few parties participating in the transitional government, and in 
particular Kabila’s party, enjoyed far greater levels of input, material support, and publicity in 
the lead-up to the elections than parties outside the transition, giving them an advantage when it 
came to polling. Excluded political parties, in fact, became so disillusioned that they called for 
violent demonstrations to disrupt the transition (United Nations, 2005). 
By focusing its capacity building efforts on the presidency and, to a lesser extent, mainstream 
political parties, the actions of the UN thus prioritized a balance of power that ensured continued 
stability over the quality of democracy and materially boosted Kabila’s capacity to wield and 
retain political power in particular. These effects were largely unintended. As described, the 
UN’s objectives were to ensure stability and free and fair elections, both of which were key 
components of its mandate. However, the personalization of the executive in Kabila signaled to 
him, first, that he was strongly backed by the UN, and, second, that the latter was prepared to 
accept lower levels of democratic fairness, transparency, and accountability in the interests of 
maintaining stability. It simultaneously signaled to Kabila’s opponents that the need for a vibrant 
democratic opposition was not a priority for the UN. Finally, the UN’s closeness to Kabila and 
tendency to view him as indispensable for holding together a fragile peace reduced its leverage 
over him, paving the way for ever-bolder authoritarian moves on his part.  
 
UN Use of Force and Security Capacity  
The UN also contributed to incumbent capacity through its support to state security services, 
as it was mandated to support the training and reform of both the Congolese armed forces and 
police (United Nations, 2008). While the mission made notoriously little headway with overall 
SSR (Onana and Taylor, 2008), it undertook a number of joint operations with the Congolese 
military, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and it later 
established the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a special unit of approximately 3,000 UN 
troops mandated to ‘neutraliz[e]’ non-state groups employing violence against civilians (United 
Nations 2013), in particular the M23 rebel group in eastern DRC. While the operations did lead 
to some reductions in rebel activity and, after the FIB was introduced, the effective elimination 
of M23, they also led to two significant unintended consequences: first, UN complicity in 
civilian harm caused by DRC’s armed forces, and second, the strengthening of Kabila’s 
increasingly personal political regime.  
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First, the FARDC has a long track record of abusing human rights, and the threat to civilians 
continued even after the joint operations were initiated. For example, Kimia II, an operation in 
2009 targeted at the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a group 
composed of ex-génocidaires from Rwanda, made some progress in reducing the FDLR’s 
numbers, but was harshly criticized for its ‘catastrophic’ humanitarian consequences, including 
massacres of civilians by government forces (United Nations, 2010b: 1). In response, MONUC 
introduced a conditionality policy, which required the mission to vet FARDC commanders 
before providing support and to withdraw support from units found to have committed abuses. 
However, the policy unsurprisingly soured relations with Kabila, and the FARDC found ways of 
circumventing it (United Nations 2010a). As a result, in the words of one UN official, the vetting 
process became ‘unworkable.’9 Subsequently, the UN often appeared to ignore its own standards 
in order to maintain stable relations with Kabila, and it often backed down out of concern that if 
it pushed too hard, Congolese authorities would exclude the UN entirely from operations.10  
This selective imposition of conditions, however, suggested that the UN was more anxious 
about the stability of Kabila’s government than enforcing a zero-tolerance policy on human 
rights violations and that it would therefore accept a high degree of misconduct by the FARDC 
in order to maintain the status quo. And indeed, the UN’s concerns in this regard were well 
founded: whenever the UN did withdraw support, it was met with strong rebukes from Kabila 
and threats that consent to the mission’s presence would be withdrawn (Butty, 2015; Vircoulon, 
2010). One UN official described an ongoing ‘tension [between] mandates from the [Security] 
Council and different types of consent—partial, bleeding…’.11 Another remarked that the 
divergent views of headquarters and field staff further prevented robust, unified responses: while 
the view from New York ‘revolve[s] around the proximity to the membership and the direct 
influence of troop, police, financial, and technology contributing countries…in the field what 
changes it is something goes boom or one political group leaves the process or you’re unable to 
do the tasks that need to get done with the assets you have available on the ground.’12 
Accordingly, in the interests of being able to remain in country, the mission frequently tempered 
its insistence on normative standards and signaled a tolerance for repressive behavior. However, 
in the process, it lost considerable leverage over the government. As one analyst put it, ‘[b]y 
2012, MONUSCO had effectively been battered into a corner by the government’ (De Vries, 
2015: 12). 
Second, these joint operations, and the compromises they entailed, materially bolstered the 
stability of Kabila’s increasingly authoritarian regime. As discussed, stable authoritarian rule 
depends in part on the material capacity of incumbent rulers (Bellin, 2004; Way, 2005), and the 
UN’s cooperation with government forces in security operations provided a supplement to the 
state’s coercive capacity. This, in turn, helped to weaken non-state groups challenging the 
authority of the state, thus shifting the domestic balance of power. One UN official recalled that 
when the UN established the FIB, ‘we totally bought into the narrative of the 
Congolese…that…they’re just victims of foreign armed groups,’ and thus that the UN was 
                                                 
9 Interview with UN official, Geneva, January 2017.  
10 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010. See also Vircoulon, 2010; de Vries, 2015.  
11 Interview with UN official, New York, February 2017. 
12 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2017. 
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correct to materially support the state against military threats against it.13 An important part of 
MONUC’s mandate was of course the restoration of state authority; however, because the state 
was highly personalized, efforts to do so were tantamount to individual support to Kabila. As 
Guéhenno scornfully notes, the mission became a ‘kind of gun for hire…President Kabila’s own 
private military company,’ enabling him to consolidate his grip on power (Paddon Rhoads, 2016: 
151). Indeed, by explicitly tasking its troops with ‘neutralizing’ the government’s rivals, the UN 
sent a clear message about the strength of and its support for the regime (Nepstad, 2013), but one 
that appeared to run counter to the UN’s normative commitment to democratization. Security 
was prioritized above political plurality, and thus, as one senior UN official put it, the UN 
became ‘an unconditional agent of the central government.’14 
 
 
Signaling a Permissive Environment  
In addition to enhancing Kabila’s capacity, the mission also contributed to the intensification of 
authoritarian behavior by signaling that it was low-cost and offering tacit support for continued 
rule by Kabila. In particular, we highlight two specific arenas in which this informational effect 
was evident—namely, lax responses to electoral malpractice and to political repression. By 
repeatedly reacting weakly to repeated instances of electoral manipulation and violent repression 
in the years after 2006, MONUC and MONUSCO consistently created a permissive environment 
for the regime and signaled toleration for the regime’s actions. Moreover, as the regime steadily 
became bolder and more overt in its authoritarian behavior, the UN remained mostly passive out 
of concern for the need to maintain consent to its presence.  
 
Lax Response To Electoral Malpractice 
One of the main ways in which authoritarian incumbents retain and consolidate their hold on 
power is through the manipulation of elections. At the same time, the successful conduct of 
elections was one of the UN’s main mandated objectives in Congo and their failure was 
perceived to entail a significant risk to stability. While selecting government through free and 
fair competition is considered to be inherently democratic, the UN’s desire to see the elections 
come off successfully meant that it was often willing to look the other way when fraudulent 
activities occurred. The UN thus signaled a permissive environment for Kabila during the 
elections in 2006 and 2011, as well as in the run-up to and aftermath of elections scheduled but 
never held in 2016.   
The 2006 elections in DRC were considered a milestone in the peace process, and they saw 
Kabila elected president after a second round victory over his main opponent, Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. As described, MONUC played a major role in the conduct of the elections, and while it 
remained officially neutral, many staff privately admitted that the mission was biased in favor of 
Kabila, with one MONUC official noting that, ‘the international community had picked Kabila 
as a winner even before he won.’15 A Kabila presidency would enable the mission to continue its 
operations without having to build new working relationships with what would be a less 
experienced and arguably even weaker government. It would also make it easier for the mission 
                                                 
13 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2017. 
14 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2010. 
15 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010. 
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to claim success in the organization of the elections and a smooth shift from the transitional 
government to the permanent one. Weiss notes that, ‘Kabila owes his victory in no small part 
to…the longstanding support that he received from the international community,’ including 
MONUC (Weiss, 2007: 151).  
This pattern of tacit support for Kabila continued in the 2011 elections, which were 
characterized by considerably higher levels of politically-driven manipulation. Early in the year, 
the government amended the constitution to remove the second round requirement for the 
presidential elections, making it easier for the incumbent to win (International Crisis Group, 
2011: i). The mission, by then renamed MONUSCO, was opposed to this step, but other than 
pressing heavily for the retention of the second round stipulation, did not sanction Kabila or his 
government, and it remained generally reluctant to criticize the electoral process. One UN 
official lamented that, ‘you [didn’t] find a single statement condemning this’ and as a result, the 
UN ‘create[d] the conditions for a president of [this] huge and diverse country…[to] be elected 
with 11 or 12% of the vote.’16 This is largely because the UN’s priority in this phase was to 
rebuild relations with the government, which had deteriorated significantly during Kabila’s first 
term, as he increasingly invoked sovereignty and security threats as a way of excluding and 
obstructing the mission. Indeed, Kabila had begun discussing mission withdrawal almost as soon 
as he took office in 2006, causing serious concern within the UN. Accordingly, when the next 
round of elections came around, MONUSCO ‘insist[ed] in public and private that they need[ed] 
to be “a neutral and supportive body and to avoid a formal judgmental role”’ (Stearns 2011). 
The mission also played a much smaller logistical and organizational role in 2011, and the 
elections were largely decried as fraudulent, with the Carter Center declaring that ‘in essence, we 
do not know who actually won the presidential elections’ (Carter Center, 2011b: 3).17 It is 
possible that Kabila would have won the elections with or without the UN’s logistical support, as 
he had access to the entirety of state resources during his campaign;18 still, the UN displayed a 
preference for continuity and stability over any kind of democratic shake up, and its 
condemnation of the allegations of fraud was lukewarm. The mission ‘note[d] with deep 
concern’ the findings of international electoral observers and urged national authorities to 
investigate without delay, but stopped short of imposing sanctions or scaling back its interaction 
with Kabila (United Nations, 2011a; United Nations, 2011b). Later, in March 2012, when the 
UN Joint Human Rights Office published a report detailing killings, disappearances, and 
arbitrary detention during the electoral period by state security forces (MONUSCO and United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights , 2012), the reaction of the mission 
remained relatively mild. In a statement, the then SRSG, Roger Meece, condemned the 
violations, but focused on the government’s pledge to launch an investigation and ‘the positive 
cooperation between MONUSCO and DRC military and civilian justice authorities’ (United 
Nations, 2012). 
Here, it is in the UN’s lack of action in the face of Kabila’s violations of electoral norms that 
we see a preference for him. The mission’s failure to do more than condemn the irregularities in 
                                                 
16 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2017. 
17 A number of irregularities were reported in the elections, including problems with registration and voter lists, 
intimidation, and implausible voter turn-out rates of 100% in some areas.  
18 The Carter Center, which monitored the elections, declared that they ‘lack[ed] credibility,’ but added that it could 
not, on the basis of that, determine whether ‘the final order of candidates [would] necessarily [have been] different.’ 
(Carter Center, 2011a).  
  15 
the election and urge investigation of abuses, while not an endorsement of these activities, 
constituted discretionary inaction in the interests of stability and maintaining good relations with 
the government. The absence of robust enforcement of the UN’s own democratic norms thus 
signaled a permissive environment for Kabila, and widened the opportunity structures for 
authoritarianism. As Louise Arbour (2012), former High Commissioner for Human Rights, wrote 
in an open letter the UN Security Council at the time, MONUSCO failed to ‘articulat[e] clear red 
lines for the credibility of the [electoral] process,’ warning that this contributed to the ‘potential 
for authoritarian drift.’ 
More recently, the build-up to the planned 2016 elections saw a continuation of the pattern of 
UN inaction in the face of worsening authoritarian practices by the Kabila regime, though there 
have been some notable exceptions. Kabila is constitutionally barred from standing for a third 
term, but he has made numerous efforts to prolong his tenure in power, including attempts to 
amend the constitution and to eliminate his main electoral challengers. These actions have been 
met with widespread outcry and have triggered, unusually for Congo, large public 
demonstrations; the government, however, has responded with violent repression, resulting in 
scores of deaths (The Guardian, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
The UN’s reaction to these events has been mixed. Privately, it has exerted strong pressure on 
Kabila and compelled him to drop some of his attempts to alter legislation or the constitution. In 
addition, the SRSG from 2015-18, Maman Sidikou, made robust statements condemning 
election-related human rights violations against opposition members, civil society, and the 
media. Yet at the same time, the mission has continued to interact with the government as usual 
(UN News Centre, 2016). Like in 2011, mission personnel worried that being too outspoken 
would damage relations with the government, resulting in a withdrawal of consent and the 
expulsion of the mission, and potentially the collapse of the many years of work and resources 
they have put into Congo (Stimson Center and Better World Campaign, 2016: 8). Here again 
then, UN inaction and selective enforcement of democratic standards have sent important 
informational signals to the regime that it can get away with authoritarian behavior. For some, 
this passive approach has made the UN complicit in DRC’s authoritarian regime. As one UN 
official pointed out, the mission’s failure to increase pressure for elections on the government 
has made the UN ‘part of…upholding…a fiction.’19 
 
Lax Response To Repression 
While the UN’s support for Kabila has been most visible during the electoral periods, the 
UN’s behavior between the elections has equally demonstrated a reluctance to press him too hard 
for fear of instability or withdrawal of consent, again signaling the permissiveness of the 
environment. Indeed, though the UN has made efforts to deter Kabila from particularly egregious 
actions, the general trend of ignoring Kabila’s authoritarian practices has continued whenever he 
was faced with challenges to his rule from political elites or the public. There are two ways in 
which the UN has abetted Kabila’s mounting authoritarianism: first, its interaction with the 
opposition has fallen dramatically, and second, it has reacted mildly to or ignored violent 
repression of the opposition and others.  
Once the transition ended in 2006, MONUC interacted markedly less with the opposition. 
This is at least partly explained by the institutional constraints of an intergovernmental 
                                                 
19 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2017. 
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organization, which cannot circumvent an elected sovereign government and member state, but it 
subsequently bolstered the regime’s ability to repress the opposition. As Gambino describes, the 
international community, including MONUC, ‘adopted the collective attitude after elections that, 
since the post-elections state was now legitimate and sovereign, it was fully in charge and donors 
could only respond to state-initiated requests’ (Gambino, 2011:7). However, because the UN had 
helped to entrench that state as one personalized in Kabila and had neglected to strengthen 
institutions, deference to the state was problematic. One UN official asserted that when MONUC 
first deployed, it ‘had a very clear purpose,’ but ‘since the elections in 2006…the goalposts have 
been slipping… and there’s an identity crisis [about] what it is that they’re actually trying to 
achieve.’ Indeed, while the UN remained in principle dedicated to the creation of a vibrant 
political life in Congo, one in which opposition groups, civil society, and others could 
participate, challenge, and hold office, the mission has become less forceful in its insistence on 
normative standards, and has instead increasingly acceded to Kabila’s demands. In so doing, 
however, it has facilitated Kabila’s ability to eliminate, repress, or intimidate these groups, and 
reduced its ability to sanction him when he has done so.  
Indeed, as soon as he was sworn in in December 2006, that is precisely what Kabila did. 
Allegations of vote-buying in 2007 gubernatorial elections that installed Kabila supporters in 
nearly all provinces provoked no reaction or sanction from MONUC, which remained keen to 
continue characterizing the end of the transition as a success (Congo Research Group, 2009; 
International Crisis Group, 2010: 8-9; International Crisis Group, 2007: 9-10). Subsequently, 
Kabila launched ‘brutal and sudden’ military offensives against Bemba and his guards in 
Kinshasa in March 2007, which saw hundreds of civilians killed (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 
3). While the UN tracked and monitored abuses, helped civilians to safety, and provided 
protection for MLC guards, it also delayed publishing reports about its investigations into what 
happened and avoided condemning the government specifically, instead denouncing violence on 
all sides (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 91-92). This is both because the government was still 
relatively new and the UN wanted to ensure its stability and because the UN needed to 
reconfigure its own post-elections role in the country and so could not afford to criticize the 
government lest it withdraw consent for the mission. Eventually, when Bemba fled the country in 
April 2007, there was ‘almost no international reaction’ (Guéhenno, 2015: 157). 
Similarly, when Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK), a politico-religious group based in Bas-Congo 
Province, demonstrated against electoral fraud in gubernatorial elections in 2007, their protests 
were met with a swift and harsh response by state security agents, with over 100 BDK members 
killed (Tull, 2010: 651). Violence broke out again in March 2008, and a major operation by the 
Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC, Congolese National Police) resulted in at least 100 BDK 
deaths, as well as arbitrary detentions, torture, and summary executions.20 While MONUC did 
conduct an investigation into the incidents, its condemnation remained mild and excluded 
penalizing the government for not holding perpetrators to account (Gambino, 2011: 7).  
Again, in order to avoid a return to war and lose consent to its deployment, the UN ‘has 
remained mostly silent’ (International Crisis Group, 2010: 1)—but that silence has spoken 
volumes about the nature of the international environment in which the Congolese regime 
operates and the low costs of authoritarian behavior.  As one senior UN official noted, Kabila 
                                                 
20 Estimates of the death toll vary, with the official government figure at 27, the MONUC investigation at 100, and 
HRW at 200 (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 77; MONUC Human Rights Division and Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008: 4). 
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‘crushed Bemba, bought the provincial parliaments, and weakened parliament, all without much 
international protest.’21 In response to separate instances of serious violent repression, the UN 
thus offered little robust response and signaled once again that the regime can get away with 
authoritarian practices without meaningful censure.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
International peacebuilders face a range of competing objectives when deployed to post-conflict 
countries. In an era of ambitious multidimensional peacebuilding, they must strive not only to 
maintain peace and prevent a resumption of hostilities, but also to build state capacity, foster 
societal reconciliation, and promote democratic development. These goals are difficult to achieve 
in tandem, as the activities used to promote one can undermine those used to achieve another. 
Furthermore, UN peacebuilders must work within the organization’s practical and operational 
constraints, which emphasize host country consent and the delivery of measureable indicators of 
success and sometimes entail differences between headquarters and missions in the field. 
As a result of these competing pressures, international peacebuilders must at times prioritize 
some goals and relegate others. In this paper, we have shown that it is often the promotion of 
democracy that is deemed dispensable when it threatens security and stability or working 
relationships with incumbent elites. In DRC, the UN has inadvertently enabled authoritarian 
practices in two ways: by supplementing state capacities and by creating a permissive 
environment for non-democratic rule. MONUC and later MONUSCO boosted the material and 
coercive capacity of the regime and contributed to the personalization of politics by investing 
heavily in its relationship with an individual leader rather than a wider spectrum of actors. 
Furthermore, in the wake of flagrant breaches of democratic norms, the UN signaled its tolerance 
for authoritarianism through muted criticism and continued cooperation with the regime.  
Our study thus highlights the limitations of the current scholarship on international 
peacebuilding, and points the way to a new research agenda on the international dimensions of 
authoritarian rule. While the literature on international peacebuilding has often noted the limited 
capacity of international missions to successfully consolidate democracy, it has paid much less 
attention to the mechanisms through which they contribute to the pillars of authoritarian stability. 
Our analysis identifies a set of causal mechanisms that can be used as a framework for 
comparative analysis of the relationship between peacebuilding and authoritarianism across 
diverse settings. In addition, our analysis suggests a set of conditions under which these causal 
mechanisms are more or less likely to operate. In particular, in large missions that have a 
mandate to use force to protect and strengthen the state, the UN may be more likely to provide 
the types of material support we outline above. Furthermore, where mission success is perceived 
as crucial to the UN’s wider reputation, as we contend was the case in Congo, both UN 
headquarters and missions in the field may be more likely to offer the tacit support to incumbent 
elites that preserves good relations but nonetheless expands the opportunity space for 
authoritarianism.  
As shown, the case of Congo demonstrated these key characteristics, and though the exact 
constellation of material and informational enabling varied over time, the overall effect remained 
                                                 
21 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010. 
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remarkably persistent. While DRC is, as noted, an extreme case, we argue that our mechanisms 
can shed light on other cases that share similarities with DRC, such as wide-ranging political and 
military mandates, large troop deployments, lengthy missions, and the use of force. For example, 
Cambodia, Haiti, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic have all hosted large-scale UN 
peacebuilding missions and struggled to introduce or consolidate stable democratic regimes. At 
the same time, the missions in these countries also exhibit variations in their levels of political 
authority domestically, including, crucially, in the extent to which the use of force has been 
authorized. Cross-case comparisons could thus tease out the ways in which each mission’s 
mandate shaped its propensity to contribute to non-democratic outcomes. Comparative research 
should also analyze the divergent experiences of countries that have experienced relatively more 
success with democratic development during and after UN peacebuilding, such as Mozambique, 
Liberia, and Timor-Leste. Our findings provide a rigorous challenge to existing assumptions and 
theoretical biases in the scholarship in this area, and further comparative research will help to 
establish the conditions under which different types of UN mission may enable authoritarianism 
or democracy in different ways in diverse settings.  
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